t r u t h o u t = - How to Rig an American Election

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How to Rig an Election in the United = States
Sludge=20 Report #154 =96 Bigger Than Watergate!
By C.D. Sludge

Tuesday 08 July 2003

A Diebold touchscreen voting = machine
Makers of=20 the walk right in, sit right down, replace ballot tallies = with=20 your own GEMS vote counting=20 program.

See Below the Companion Article For Detail And Screenshots = Of An=20 Election Hack=85
Inside A=20 U.S. Election Vote Counting Program

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The story you are about to read is in this writer's view the = biggest=20 political scandal in American history, if not global history. = And it is=20 being broken today here in New Zealand.

This story cuts to the bone the machinery of democracy in = America=20 today. Democracy is the only protection we have against despotic = and=20 arbitrary government, and this story is deeply disturbing.

Imagine if you will that you are a political interest group = that=20 wishes to control forevermore the levers of power. Imagine = further that=20 you know you are likely to implement a highly unpopular = political=20 agenda, and you do not wish to be removed by a ballot driven = backlash.=20

One way to accomplish this outcome would be to adopt the = Mugabe=20 (Zimbabwe) or Hun Sen (Cambodia) approach. You agree to hold = elections,=20 but simultaneously arrest, imprison and beat your opponents and = their=20 supporters. You stuff ballot boxes, disenfranchise voters who = are=20 unlikely to vote for you, distort electoral boundaries and = provide=20 insufficient polling stations in areas full of opposition = supporters.=20

However as so many despots have discovered, eventually such=20 techniques always fail =96 often violently. Hence, if you are a = truly=20 ambitious political dynasty you have to be a bit more subtle = about your=20 methods.

Imagine then if it were possible to somehow subvert the = voting=20 process itself in such a way that you could steal elections = without=20 anybody knowing.

Imagine for example if you could:=20

secure control of the companies that make the voting = machines and=20 vote counting software;

centralise vote counting systems, and politicise their=20 supervision;

legislate for the adoption of such systems throughout your = domain,=20 and provide large amounts of money for the purchase of these=20 systems;

establish systems of vote counting that effectively = prevent=20 anybody on the ground in the election =96 at a booth or = precinct level -=20 from seeing what is happening at a micro-level;

get all the major media to sign up to a single = exit-polling system=20 that you also control =96 removing the risk of exit-polling = showing up=20 your shenanigans.

And imagine further that you install a backdoor, or numerous=20 backdoors, in the vote counting systems you have built that = enable you=20 to manipulate the tabulation of results in real time as they are = coming=20 in.

Such a system would enable you to intervene in precisely the = minimum=20 number of races necessary to ensure that you won a majority on = election=20 night. On the basis of polling you could pick your marginal = seats and=20 thus keep your tweaking to a bare minimum.

Such a system would enable you to minimise the risks of = discovery of=20 your activities.

Such a system would enable you to target and remove = individual=20 political opponents who were too successful, too popular or too=20 inquisitive.

And most importantly of all, such a system would enable you = to=20 accomplish all the above without the public being in the least = aware of=20 what you were doing. When confronted with the awfulness of your=20 programme they would be forced to concede that at least it is = the result=20 of a democratic process.

How To Rig An Election In The United States

So how would such a system actually work?

Well one way to run such a corrupt electoral system might = look like=20 this:=20

Each voting precinct (or booth) could be fitted with = electronic=20 voting systems, optical scanning systems, punch card voting = systems or=20 the more modern touchscreen electronic voting machines; =

At the close of play each day the booth/precinct = supervisor could=20 be under instructions to compile an electronic record of the = votes=20 cast in their booth;

They might print out a report that contains only the = details of=20 the total votes count for that precinct/booth, and then file = via modem=20 the full electronic record of votes through to the County = supervisor;=20

The County Supervisor could be equipped with a special = piece of=20 software and a bank of modems that enables all these results = to be=20 received and tabulated in the internals of the computer; =

The County Supervisors themselves could be assured that = their=20 system was bullet proof, certified and contained = tamper-protection=20 mechanisms par excellence;

The Country Supervisor could be given a range of tools for = looking=20 at the data within this software, but nothing to enable them = to=20 directly manipulate the results;

But unbeknownst to the County Supervisor the software = could=20 actually create three separate records of the voting data; =

Meanwhile - also unbeknownst to the County Supervisor - = these=20 three tables of voting data could be in fact completely = insecure and=20 accessible simply through a common database programme, say = Microsoft=20 Access;

Having the three tables would enable you to keep the real = data in=20 place =96 so the system could pass spot tests on individual = precincts=20 and booth results (should a precinct supervisor be = particularly=20 astute) -while simultaneously enabling you to manipulate the = bottom=20 line result;

Finally you might also enhance the election hacker's = powers by=20 including within the software a utility to enable them to = cover their=20 tracks by changing the date and time stamps on files and = remove=20 evidence of your tampering.

Fantasy Becomes Reality

The above description of a corrupt voting system is not the = result of=20 an overactive imagination. Rather it is the result of a = extensive=20 research by computer programmers and journalists working around = the=20 globe. Principally it is the work of investigative Journalist = Bev=20 Harris, author of the soon to be published book " Black Box = Voting:=20 Ballot Tampering In The 21st Century "

And most important of all it is the result of research = focussed on=20 investigating the actual software distributed by one of the = largest=20 voting systems companies operating in the recent U.S. Elections. =

CAVEAT: It is important to note that the research into = this=20 subject has not established that the files we have been working = on were=20 in fact in situ in County Election Supervisors offices at the = last=20 election =96 nor have we proof that the back door we have = discovered -=20 which might enable the rigging of elections - was actually used = in any=20 recent election. However it is the considered opinion of all = those=20 involved in this investigation that it is not up to us as = journalists or=20 programmers to prove that elections were rigged, rather it is a=20 responsibility of the electoral system itself to prove its = integrity.=20

What you read here amounts to revelation of evidence of = motive,=20 opportunity, method, prior conduct , and a variety of items of,=20 consistent unexplained circumstantial evidence . Significantly = we do not=20 believe we have sufficient resources to complete this = investigation to=20 its conclusion and are therefore making available our findings = to the=20 media, community organisations, political parties, computer = scientists=20 and geeks in the anticipation that they will pick up the torch = and take=20 extend this inquiry into every county in the United States.

How We Discovered The Backdoor

The story of how this story emerged is a great tale in = itself, most=20 of which has already been told in this report by Bev = Harris.
System Integrity Flaw Discovreed at Diebold = Election=20 Systems

The short version of the story is relatively simple.

In the course of investigating the issue of the integrity of = new=20 electronic voting machines Bev Harris learned that people around = the=20 world had been downloading from an open FTP site belonging to = Diebold=20 Election Systems one of the leading manufactures of voting = systems.

This website contained several gigabytes of files including = manuals,=20 source codes and installation versions of numerous parts of the = Diebold=20 voting system, and of its vote counting programme GEMS.

Realising we had stumbled across what might be the equivalent = of the=20 Pentagon Papers for elections, the full contents of this website = have=20 been secured around the world at several locations. The original = website=20 was itself taken down on January 29th 2003.

We can now reveal for the first time the location of a = complete=20 online copy of the original data set. As we anticipate attempts = to=20 prevent the distribution of this information we encourage = supporters of=20 democracy to make copies of these files and to make them = available on=20 websites and file sharing networks.
Go to = Original=20 Data

As many of the files are zip password protected you may need = some=20 assistance in opening them, we have found that the utility = available at=20 the following URL works well:
Go to LostPassword

Finally some of the zip files are partially damaged, but = these too=20 can be read by using the utility at:
Go to = Zip-Repair

At this stage in this inquiry we do not believe that we have = come=20 even remotely close to investigating all aspects of this data. = I.E.=20 There is no reason to believe that the security flaws discovered = so far=20 are the only ones.

Finally, for obvious reasons it is important that this = information is=20 distributed as widely as possible as quickly as possible. We = encourage=20 all web bloggers, web publishers and web media to re-publish and = link to=20 this article and to its companion article by Bev Harris which = contains=20 detailed descriptions of how to use the GEMS software to rig an=20 election.:

To conclude this overview article I will make a few more = comments on=20 the evidence we have thus far that the U.S. election system has = been=20 compromised. As stated earlier we do not at this stage have = proof that=20 it has in fact been been compromised through this method, just a = great=20 deal of circumstantial evidence that it could have been.

If this was Watergate, we are effectively at the point of = discovering=20 evidence of a break-in and have received the call from = deep-throat=20 telling us that should dig much deeper.

Proof will follow in time we expect, but only if the work we = have=20 begun is completed and this inquiry is taken into every corner = of the=20 U.S. electoral system.

Evidence Of Motive

This is probably the easiest part of this puzzle to get your = head=20 around. The motivation of the Republican Party in general and = the=20 current administration in particular to gain ever greater = amounts of=20 power - by whatever means possible and damn the consequences - = is=20 evidenced most recently in the Supreme Court's partisan = appointment of=20 George Bush Jr. as President, the attempt to recall California = Governor=20 Gray Davis, and the Ken Starr investigation and attempted = impeachment of=20 President Clinton.

Evidence Of Opportunity

Republican connected control over the major election systems=20 companies in the United States has been thoroughly researched. =

Bob Urosevich, CEO of Diebold Election Systems is also the = founder of=20 ES&S, a competing voting machine company. Together these two = companies are responsible for tallying around 80% of votes cast = in the=20 United States. Also significant, from what we can determine = about the=20 architecture of the software, is that its basic structure was=20 specifically a creation of Mr Urosevich's company I-Mark.

For more background on Diebold Systems connections to the = Republican=20 Party see:
Diebold - The Face Of Modern Ballot = Tampering

Meanwhile Presidential wannabee and Republican Party United = States=20 Senator Chuck Hagel has been directly connected to ES&S via = his=20 campaign finance director, Michael McCarthy, who has admitted = that=20 Senator Hagel still owns a beneficial interest in the ES&S = parent=20 company, the McCarthy Group.
Senate Ethics Director Resigns; Senator Hagel = Admits Owning=20 Voting Machine Company

Evidence Of Method

The evidence of method has been detailed in a companion = article by=20 Bev Harris, author of the soon to be published block-buster = Black Box=20 Voting.
Inside A U.S. Election Vote Counting Program=20
http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0307/S00065.htm

In this article =96 which contains screenshots from the = software and=20 detailed instructions on how one might rig an election - Bev = Harris=20 explains security flaws thus:

The GEMS election file contains more than one "set of books." = They=20 are hidden from the person running the GEMS program, but you can = see=20 them if you go into Microsoft Access.

You might look at it like this: Suppose you have votes on = paper=20 ballots, and you pile all the paper ballots in room one. Then, = you make=20 a copy of all the ballots and put the stack of copies in room 2. =

You then leave the door open to room 2, so that people can = come in=20 and out, replacing some of the votes in the stack with their = own.

You could have some sort of security device that would tell = you if=20 any of the copies of votes in room 2 have been changed, but you = opt not=20 to.

Now, suppose you want to count the votes. Should you count = them from=20 room 1 (original votes)? Or should you count them from room 2, = where=20 they may or may not be the same as room 1? What Diebold chose to = do in=20 the files we examined was to count the votes from "room2."

Evidence Of Prior Conduct

It is a recorded fact that every system of balloting = established in=20 America has been gamed and rigged. I.E. America's political=20 practitioners have a very long history of ballot rigging and = vote=20 tampering. This is nothing new and evidence of the sort we have=20 uncovered has been long predicted by computer scientists such as = Dr=20 Rebecca Mercuri.

In more recent history investigative Journalist Greg Palast = has=20 documented in detail Katherine Harris's use of electronic data = matching=20 technologies to disenfranchise thousands of Florida voters in = advance of=20 the 2000 Presidential election.

We highly recommend readers purchase a copy of "The Best = Democracy=20 Money Can Buy" by Greg Palast to read much more about this.

A compendium of links on Palast's investigations can be found = via a=20 Google search on:
"greg palast florida katherine harris"

Consistent Unexplained Circumstantial Evidence

During the 2002 Mid-term there were numerous reports of = unusual=20 happenings in counties throughout the United States.

Among the phenomena reported were voting numbers suddenly = fluctuating=20 in the middle of the counting process, something you might = expect to see=20 if the backdoor identified above were used clumsily.

An organisation called Votewatch was set up during the 2002 = elections=20 to record unusual happenings and its archives can be viewed = here:
Go = to=20 Archives

It will suffice here to cite a couple of specific examples = =96 these=20 are excerpts from the soon to be published " Black Box Voting: = Ballot=20 Tampering In The 21st Century". These examples of actual events = are=20 consistent with the existence and use of an electronic vote = counting=20 hack described above.

November 1990, Seattle, Washington - Worse than the=20 butterfly ballot, some Democratic candidates watched votes = alight,=20 then flutter away. Democrat Al Williams saw 90 votes wander = off his=20 tally between election night and the following day, though no = new=20 counting had been done. At the same time, his opponent, = Republican Tom=20 Tangen, gained 32 votes. At one point several hundred ballots = added to=20 returns didn=92t result in any increase in the number of = votes. But=20 elsewhere, the number of votes added exceeded the number of = additional=20 ballots counted. A Republican candidate achieved an amazing = surge in=20 his absentee percentage for no apparent reason. And no one = seemed to=20 notice (until a determined Democratic candidate started = demanding an=20 answer) that the machines simply forgot to count 14,000 votes. =

November 1996, Bergen County, New Jersey - Democrats = told=20 Bergen County Clerk Kathleen Donovan to come up with a better=20 explanation for mysterious swings in vote totals. Donovan = blamed=20 voting computers for conflicting tallies that rose and fell by = 8,000=20 or 9,000 votes. The swings perplexed candidates of both = parties. For=20 example, the Republican incumbent, Anthony Cassano, had won by = about=20 7,000 votes as of the day after the election but his lead = evaporated=20 later. One candidate actually lost 1,600 votes during the = counting.=20 =93How could something like that possibly happen?=94 asked = Michael=20 Guarino, Cassano=92s Democratic challenger. =93Something is = screwed up=20 here.=94

November 1999, Onondaga County, New York - Computers = gave=20 the election to the wrong candidate, then gave it back. Bob = Faulkner,=20 a political newcomer, went to bed on Election Night confident = he had=20 helped complete a Republican sweep of three open council = seats. But=20 after Onondaga County Board of Elections staffers rechecked = the=20 totals, Faulkner had lost to Democratic incumbent Elaine = Lytel.

April 2002, Johnson County, Kansas - Johnson = County=92s new=20 Diebold touch screen machines, proclaimed a success on = election night,=20 did not work as well as originally believed. Incorrect vote = totals=20 were discovered in six races, three of them contested, leaving = county=20 election officials scrambling to make sure the unofficial = results were=20 accurate. Johnson County Election Commissioner Connie Schmidt = checked=20 the machines and found that the computers had under- and = over-reported=20 hundreds of votes. =93The machines performed terrifically,=94 = said Bob=20 Urosevich, CEO of Diebold Election Systems. =93The anomaly = showed up on=20 the reporting part.=94

The problem, however, was so perplexing that Schmidt asked = the=20 Board of Canvassers to order a hand re-count to make sure the = results=20 were accurate. Unfortunately, the touch screen machines did = away with=20 the ballots, so the only way to do a hand recount is to have = the=20 machine print its internal data page by page. Diebold tried to = re-create the error in hopes of correcting it. =93I wish I had = an=20 answer,=94 Urosevich said. In some cases, vote totals changed=20 dramatically.

November 2002, Comal County, Texas - A Texas-sized = lack of=20 curiosity about discrepancies: The uncanny coincidence of = three=20 winning Republican candidates in a row tallying up exactly = 18,181=20 votes each was called weird, but apparently no one thought it = was=20 weird enough to audit. Conversion to alphabet: 18181 18181 = 18181 ahaha=20 ahaha ahaha

November 2002, Baldwin County, Alabama - No one at = the=20 voting machine company can explain the mystery votes that = changed=20 after polling places had closed, flipping the election from = the=20 Democratic winner to a Republican in the Alabama governor=92s = race.=20 =93Something happened. I don=92t have enough intelligence to = say exactly=20 what,=94 said Mark Kelley of ES&S. Baldwin County results = showed=20 that Democrat Don Siegelman earned enough votes to win the = state of=20 Alabama. All the observers went home. The next morning, = however, 6,300=20 of Siegelman=92s votes inexplicably had disappeared, and the = election=20 was handed to Republican Bob Riley. A recount was requested, = but=20 denied.

November 2002, New York - Voting machine tallies = impounded=20 in New York: Software programming errors hampered and confused = the=20 vote tally on election night and most of the next day, causing = elections officials to pull the plug on the vote-reporting Web = site.=20 Commissioners ordered that the voting machine tallies be = impounded,=20 and they were guarded overnight by a Monroe County deputy = sheriff.=20

November 2002, Georgia - Election officials lost = their=20 memory: Fulton County election officials said that memory = cards from=20 67 electronic voting machines had been misplaced, so ballots = cast on=20 those machines were left out of previously announced vote = totals. No=20 hand count can shine any light on this; the entire state of = Georgia=20 went to touch-screen machines with no physical record of the = vote.=20 Fifty-six cards, containing 2,180 ballots, were located, but = 11 memory=20 cards still were missing two days after the election: Bibb = County and=20 Glynn County each had one card missing after the initial vote = count.=20 When DeKalb County election officials went home early = Wednesday=20 morning, they were missing 10 cards.

Go to Original

Inside A U.S. Election Vote Counting Program
By Bev = Harris

Tuesday 08 July 2003

Bev Harris is the Author of the soon to be published book = " Black=20 Box Voting: Ballot Tampering In The 21st Century "
http://www.blackboxvoting.com/

Contents
Introduction<= /A>
Part = 1 - Can=20 the Votes be Changed?
Part = 2 - Can=20 the Password be Bypassed?
Part = 3 =96 Can=20 the Audit Trail be Altered?

--------

Introduction

For both optical scans and touch screens operating using = Diebold=20 election systems, the voting system works like this:

Voters vote at the precinct, running their ballot through an = optical=20 scan, or entering their vote on a touch screen.

After the polls close, poll workers transmit the votes that = have been=20 accumulated to the county office. They do this by modem.

At the county office, there is a "host computer" with a = program on it=20 called GEMS.

GEMS receives the incoming votes and stores them in a vote = ledger.=20 But then, we found, it makes another set of books with a copy of = what is=20 in vote ledger 1. And at the same time, it makes yet a third = vote ledger=20 with another copy.

The Elections Supervisor never sees these three sets of = books. All=20 she sees is the reports she can run: Election summary (totals, = county=20 wide) or a detail report (totals for each precinct). She has no = way of=20 knowing that her GEMS program is using multiple sets of books, = because=20 the GEMS interface draws its data from an Access database, which = is=20 hidden.

And here is what is quite odd: On the programs we tested, the = Election summary (totals, county wide) come from the vote ledger = 2=20 instead of vote ledger 1.

Now, think of it like this: You want the report to add up = ONLY the=20 ACTUAL votes. But, unbeknownst to the election supervisor, votes = can be=20 added and subtracted from vote ledger 2, so that it may or may = not match=20 vote ledger 1. Her official report comes from vote ledger 2, = which has=20 been disengaged from vote ledger 1.

If she asks for a detailed report for some precincts, though, = her=20 report comes from vote ledger 1. Therefore, if you keep the = correct=20 votes in vote ledger 1, a spot check of detailed precincts (even = if you=20 compare voter-verified paper ballots) will always be correct. =

And what is vote ledger 3 for? For now, we are calling it the = "Lord=20 Only Knows" vote ledger.

From a programming standpoint, there might be reasons to have = a=20 special vote ledger that disengages from the real one. From an=20 accounting standpoint, using multiple sets of books is NOT OKAY. = From an=20 accounting standpoint, the ONLY thing the totals report should = add up is=20 the original votes in vote ledger 1. Proper bookkeeping NEVER = allows an=20 extra ledger that can be used to just erase the original = information and=20 add your own. And certainly, it is improper to have the official = reports=20 come from the second ledger, the one which may or may not have=20 information erased or added.

Can These Votes Be Changed?

Let's go into the GEMS program and run a report on the Max=20 Cleland/Saxby Chambliss race. (This is an example, and does not = contain=20 the real data.) Here is what the Totals Report will look like in = GEMS:=20

CLICK FOR BIG VERSION=20
As it stands, Cleland is stomping Chambliss. Let's make it = more=20 exciting.

The GEMS election file contains more than one "set of books." = They=20 are hidden from the person running the GEMS program, but you can = see=20 them if you go into Microsoft Access.

You might look at it like this: Suppose you have votes on = paper=20 ballots, and you pile all the paper ballots in room one. Then, = you make=20 a copy of all the ballots and put the stack of copies in room 2. =

You then leave the door open to room 2, so that people can = come in=20 and out, replacing some of the votes in the stack with their = own.

You could have some sort of security device that would tell = you if=20 any of the copies of votes in room 2 have been changed, but you = opt not=20 to.

Now, suppose you want to count the votes. Should you count = them from=20 room 1 (original votes)? Or should you count them from room 2, = where=20 they may or may not be the same as room 1? What Diebold chose to = do in=20 the files we examined was to count the votes from "room2."

Illustration:
If an intruder opens the GEMS program in = Microsoft=20 Access, they will find that each candidate has an assigned = number:=20
=20
One can then go see how many votes a candidate has by = visiting "room=20 1" which is called the CandidateCounter:
=

In the above example, "454" represents Max Cleland and "455"=20 represents Saxby Chambliss.

Now let's visit Room2, which has copies of Room1. You can = find it in=20 an Access table called SumCandidateCounter:
=

Now let's put our own votes in Room2. We'll put Chambliss = ahead by a=20 nose, by subtracting 100 from Cleland and adding 100 to = Chambliss.=20 Always add and delete the same number of votes, so the number of = voters=20 won't change.

Notice that we have only tampered with the votes in "Room 2." = In Room=20 1, they remain the same. Room 1, after tampering with Room 2: =
=

Now let's run a report again. Go into GEMS and run the totals = report.=20 Here's what it looks like now:

CLICK FOR BIG VERSION

Now, the above example is for a simple race using just one = precinct.=20 If you run a detail report, you'll see that the precinct report = pulls=20 the untampered data, while the totals report pulls the tampered = data.=20 This would allow a precinct to pass a spot check.

Can the Password be Bypassed?

At least a dozen full installation versions of the GEMS = program were=20 available on the Diebold ftp site. The manual, also available on = the ftp=20 site, tells that the default password in a new installation is=20 "GEMSUSER." Anyone who downloaded and installed GEMS can bypass = the=20 passwords in elections. In this examination, we installed GEMS, = clicked=20 "new" and made a test election, then closed it and opened the = same file=20 in Microsoft Access.

One finds where they store the passwords by clicking the = "Operator"=20 table. Anyone can copy an encrypted password from there, go to = an=20 election database, and paste it into that.

Example: Cobb County Election file

One can overwrite the "admin" password with another, copied = from=20 another GEMS installation. It will appear encrypted; no worries, = just=20 cut and paste. In this example, we saved the old "admin" = password so we=20 could replace it later and delete the evidence that we'd been = there. An=20 intruder can grant himself administrative privileges by putting = zeros in=20 the other boxes, following the example in "admin."

CLICK FOR BIG VERSION

How many people can gain access? A sociable election hacker = can give=20 all his friends access to the database too! In this case, they = were=20 added in a test GEMS installation and copied into the Cobb = County=20 Microsoft Access file. It encrypted each password as a different = character string, however, all the passwords are the same word:=20 "password." Password replacement can also be done directly in = Access. To=20 assess how tightly controlled the election files really are, we = added 50=20 of our friends; so far, we haven't found a limit to how many = people can=20 be granted access to the election database.

CLICK FOR BIG VERSION

Using this simple way to bypass password security, an = intruder, or an=20 insider, can enter GEMS programs and play with election = databases to=20 their heart's content.

Can the Audit Trail be = Altered?

Britain J. Williams, Ph.D., is the official voting machine = certifier=20 for the state of Georgia, and he sits on the committee that = decides how=20 voting machines will be tested and evaluated. Here's what he had = to say=20 about the security of Diebold voting machines, in a letter dated = April=20 23, 2003:

"Computer System Security Features: The computer portion of = the=20 election system contains features that facilitate overall = security of=20 the election system. Primary among these features is a = comprehensive set=20 of audit data. For transactions that occur on the system, a = record is=20 made of the nature of the transaction, the time of the = transaction, and=20 the person that initiated the transaction. This record is = written to the=20 audit log. If an incident occurs on the system, this audit log = allows an=20 investigator to reconstruct the sequence of events that occurred = surrounding the incident.

In addition, passwords are used to limit access to the system = to=20 authorized personnel."

Since Dr. Williams listed the audit data as the primary = security=20 feature, we decided to find out how hard it is to alter the = audit log.=20

Here is a copy of a GEMS audit report.

CLICK FOR BIG VERSION

Note that a user by the name of "Evildoer" was added. = Evildoer=20 performed various functions, including running reports to check = his=20 vote-rigging work, but only some of his activities showed up on = the=20 audit log.
It was a simple matter to eliminate Evildoer. = First, we=20 opened the election database in Access, where we opened the = audit table:=20

CLICK FOR BIG VERSION

Then, we deleted all the references to Evildoer and, because = we=20 noticed that the audit log never noticed when the admin closed = the GEMS=20 program before, we tidily added an entry for that.

CLICK FOR BIG VERSION

Access encourages those who create audit logs to use = auto-numbering,=20 so that every logged entry has an uneditable log number. Then, = if one=20 deletes audit entries, a gap in the numbering sequence will = appear.=20 However, we found that this feature was disabled, allowing us to = write=20 in our own log numbers. We were able to add and delete from the = audit=20 without leaving a trace.

Going back into GEMS, we ran another audit log to see if = Evildoer had=20 been purged:

CLICK FOR BIG VERSION

As you can see, the audit log appears pristine.

In fact, when using Access to adjust the vote tallies we = found that=20 tampering never made it to the audit log at all.

A curious plug-in was found in the GEMS program, called PE = Explorer.=20 Presumably, this is used to do security checks. Another = function,=20 though, is to change the date and time stamp:

Although we interviewed election officials and also the = technicians=20 who set up the Diebold system in Georgia, and they confirmed = that the=20 GEMS system does use Microsoft Access, is designed for remote = access,=20 and does receive "data corrections" from time to time from = support=20 personnel, we have not yet had the opportunity to test the above = tampering methods in the County Election Supervisor's office. =

We used an actual data file, labeled "Cobb County" for much = of our=20 testing.

Print=20 This Story = E-mail This=20 Story

=A9 : t = r u t h o u t=20 2003